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What we shall do if we are forced into the Common Market
and have to deal with Continental legislation and decisions, I
just do not know. We shall have to learn a lot about not only
European law but more important about the habits of mind of
European lawyers which I suspect are more theoretical and less
practical than our own.1
Soon after Lord Reid had left this question partially un-
answered, Great Britain became a member of the European
Economic Community, brought, at last, to the shores of the con-
tinent. The limelight which, until then, was mainly focused on the
economic and political problems of European integration now had to
include within its coverage a third major component part of integra-
tion: law. The additional dimensional problem of British membership
in the EEC raised the very sensitive issue which centuries of hostility
and rapprochement, indifference and mutual concern, had not yet
had to face-that is, whether, the civil law and the common law
systems could find a modus vivendi under economic and political
constraints. Indeed, European community law is more than a few
treaties, it is more than a series of regulations or directives, it is
more than judicial decisions from a European court; it is a system of
law. Moreover, it is a civil law system identified by its particular
style of drafting legislation and its methodology of legal reasoning.
COMMON AND CIVIL LAW APPROACHES TO LEGISLATION
AND LEGAL REASONING
The attitude of the common lawyer vis-A-vis legislation is one
deeply rooted in his historical past which can be characterized as
one of happenings, a taught tradition of decisions, "a tradition of ap-
plying judicial experience to the decision of controversies .... a tradi-
tion ... shaped in its beginnings as a quest for reconciling authority
with reason, imposed rule with customs of human conduct and so the
universal with the concrete."2 The Corpus Juris Civilis, the magnifi-
*Professor of Law, Associate Director, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana
State University.
1. Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. SOC'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 22, 28 (1972).
2. R. POUND, What i8 the Common Law?, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 18
(1937).
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cent compilation of Roman law by the Emperor Justinian and
regarded as the supreme expression of statutory law relegating
custom and tradition to a subsidiary role, never acquired great
stature in England, where it succumbed easily to the vigorously in-
dependent and meticulously pervasive development of judge-made
law. The ever-growing role and powers of the King's Courts, in the
Middle Ages in particular, found no containment, but rather an in-
ducement, in the paucity of royal enactments. Thus the judges came
to look upon themselves and the common law they were administer-
ing as a shield protecting the governed from the government, be it
the executive, the legislative, or an alliance of both. The common
law judge is independent; "[hie wields the royal authority to do
justice. He is not accountable to administrative superiors. In the
words attributed by Coke to Bracton, he decides under God and the
Law."' The courts built their supremacy on "a frame of mind which
prefers to go forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this
case or that case to the next case, as justice in each case seems to
require, instead of seeking to refer everything back to supposed
universals."' Legislators are presumed to be incapable of rising
above private interests to aim for the good of all in pursuit of a goal
or an ideal conceived more as the reason of State than as the end
result of cumulated human interests. Therefore, statutes are seen as
deviations, alterations, or departures from the cohesive and well-
structured scheme of the common law, so that "the business of the
judges is to keep the mischief of [the Parliament's] interference
within the narrowest possible bounds."5 Statutory law is lex
specialis. The British judges
regarded it as dangerous and unnatural to prescribe the out-
come of comparable cases in advance by making general regula-
tions to cover the whole area of life; "we will cross the bridge
when we come to it." Thus English statutes were originally
sporadic ad hoc enactments which as legal sources had much less
force than the unwritten Common Law which had been
developed by the judges through the centuries and which
covered all areas of the law equally. The judges saw statutes as
being an evil, a necessary evil, no doubt, which disturbed the
lovely harmony of the Common law .... .
This traditional approach to statutes is still deeply carved in the
minds of 20th century judges who see in the common law an "old
3. Id. at 15.
4. Id. at 19.
5. F. POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 85 (1882).




fashioned, hand-made, expensive, quality good[]"' and belittle
statutes as
the brash products of modern technology. If you think in
months, want an instant solution for your problems and don't
mind that it won't wear well, then go for legislation. If you think
in decades, prefer orderly growth and believe in the old proverb
more haste less speed, then stick to the common law. But do not
seek a middle way by speeding up and streamlining the develop-
ment of the common law.8
The common law approach to legislation is in sharp contrast
with the civil law system belief that justice, as the essence of the
Law, is best achieved through enacted law which is but the "solemn
expression of legislative will."9 Such an attitude is in agreement
with democratic principles; it is also justified by the fact that state
and administrative bodies are "without doubt, better placed ... to
coordinate the different sectors of social activity and to determine
where the common interest lies .... [LIegislation . . . appears to be
the best means of enunciating the rules needed at a time when the
complexity of social relations demands that precision and clarity be
paramount."0 This primacy attached to legislation explains why "in
the tradition of the civil law the judge is a part of the ad-
ministrative hierarchy,"'" an authority under a power bound "to
regard statutes in the light of the thesis of the civil law that its
precepts are statements of general principles, to be used as guides
to decision."" The lawmaking power rests in a representative body
which formulates the popular will and thus raises legislation to the
apex of the multi-faceted pyramid of the sources of law devised and
arranged in a dogmatic and systematic pattern. In the common law
tradition
[t]here is no systematic, hierarchical theory of sources of law:
legislation, of course, is law, but so are other things, including
judicial decisions .... The attitudes that led France to adopt the
metric system, decimal currency, legal codes, and a rigid theory
of sources of law, all in the space of a few years, are still basically
alien to the common law tradition."'
7. Reid, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1.
10. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 86
(1968).
11. R. POUND, supra note 2, at 15.
12. H. STONE, The Common Law In The United States, in THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 131 (1937).
13. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 26 (1969).
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Just as one's outward behavior, way of speech, and body control
are a tangible portrait of one's intellectual, emotional and moral
senses, similarly, the styles and techniques followed by the common
law, on the one hand, and the civil law, on the other, in drafting
statutes are but a betrayal of the deeply-rooted attitudes and
understandings of these two major legal systems vis-a-vis legisla-
tion.
If metaphors are neither considered out of place nor looked upon
as disrespectful, possibly the artful expression of the civil law and
the common law styles of drafting statutes may be found in cubism
and pointillism.
The civil law style is but the materialization of a certain
philosophical view of legislation as being
not a pure act of power [but] . . . an act of wisdom, justice and
reason. The legislator does not exercise authority as much as he
serves a sacred office. He must not forget that legislation is
made for men, and that men are not made for legislation; . . .
[that] it is impossible to anticipate all the drawbacks that prac-
tice alone can reveal .... that it would be absurd to surrender
one's self to a belief in absolute perfection in matters susceptible
of only relative goodness .... [that] [t]o anticipate everything is
a goal impossible of attainment . . . . In any case, how can one
fetter the movement of time? . . . How can one know and
calculate in advance what only experience can reveal? Can a
forecast ever encompass matters that thought cannot reach?"
Consequently, the civil law style of drafting parallels, in a sense, the
cubist painter's "monochromatic expression of natural forms in
terms of simplified planes and lines and basic geometric shapes
sometimes organized to depict the subject simultaneously from
several points of view ... ."" In legal terms, the civilian technique
of drafting statutes is "to set, by taking a broad approach, the
general propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be
fertile in application, and not to get down to the details of questions
which may arise in particular instances."'" The objective is to pro-
vide the courts with principles of broad application and to refrain
from locking the judges in a straitjacket of details. It is, then, a
paradox of history that the French Revolution born, to some extent,
14. Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 767-69
(1969).
15. This is Webster's definition of "cubism." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 550 (13th ed. 1964).
16. Levasseur, supra note 14, at 769.
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out of the deep concern of protecting the people from the equity of
Parliaments, ended up devising an approach to legislation such that
it was to leave "[a] host of things ... to the province of custom, the
discussion of learned men and the decision of judges . . . .It is for
the judge and the jurist, imbued with the general spirit of the laws,
to direct their application.""7 The civilian legislator draws the
simplified lines and shapes of the will of the people and entrusts to
the judge the ultimate care of using his palette to give life to a
monochromatic expression of legislative will. The mutual trust and
reciprocal confidence in the ultimate responsibility of administering
justice has been most provocatively, and somewhat ambiguously,
phrased by Esmein in terms that common lawyers could claim as
theirs; "[clase law is the true expression of the civil law; it is the
real and positive law, as long as it has not been changed."18
By contrast, the drafting technique of the common law legislator
resembles the extreme care and minuteness of a Seurat and the
school of pointillism, whose artistic expression consisted in "apply-
ing dots or tiny strokes of color elements to a surface so that when
seen from a distance the dots or strokes blend luminously
together.'9 The common law approach to the art of drafting statutes
is shaped by "a frame of mind which habitually looks at things in
the concrete, not in the abstract; which puts its faith in experience
rather than in abstractions."2 The common law's faith in experience
and concern for realism views law as "a living organism of immense
complexity," and appraises its logic as "a practical logic, not con-
cerned with the absolute, but with concrete reality; the reality,
however, must be regulated by rule."21 Statutes are, thus, "elaborate
to the point of complexity; detailed to the point of unintelligibility;
yet strangely uninformative on matters of principle."22
Continental observers are struck by the pedantic and prolix
detail in which statutes deal with the simplest matters, obviously
so as to make it more difficult for the judges to get around
them: where a continental legislator would be satisified with a
single comprehensive notion, the English legislator, simply in
17. Id.
18. Herman, Excerpts From a Discourse on the Code Napoleon by Portalis and
Case Law and Doctrine by A. Esmein, 18 Loy. L. REV. 23, 33 (1971).
19. "Pointillism" is thus defined by Webster's. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1750 (13th ed. 1964).
20. R. POUND, supra note 2, at 18-19.
21. L. WRIGHT, The Common Law in its Old Home, in THE FUTURE OF THE COM-
MON LAW 66 (1937).
22. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 44 (1976).
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order to bind the judges, will use five specific terms, without
adding anything to the meaning. In Pollock's view, the art of
legislation towards the end of the eighteenth century was "to
pile up as many words as possible, significant and insignificant,
on the chance that in their multitude the intention of the enact-
ment might find safety" . . . ; it must be said, with all respect,
that one can quite often find traces of this attitude even in
modern legislation. 3
These two opposite conceptual views of legislation as a source of
law, and as an art, led to two basically different methods of inter-
pretation of statutory law.
Roscoe Pound has admirably synthesized the civil law method of
interpretation in these words:
The civilian is at his best in interpreting, developing, and apply-
ing written texts. From the time that the Law of Citations gave
legislative authority to the writings of the great jurisconsults,
he has thought of the form of the law as typically that of a code,
ancient or modern. His method has been one of logical develop-
ment and logical exposition of supposedly universal enacted pro-
positions. His whole tradition is one of the logical handling of
written texts."
The civilian jurist, imbued with the spirit of the laws, will approach
a statute as the cornerstone of the edifice he is called upon to build
by interpretation, and he will quite naturally presume that the legis-
lator, when formulating principles, has meant for the judge to ex-
tract all their "substantifique moelle."' 5 Hence, having been en-
trusted by the legislator with the principles most favorable to the
common good, the civilian judge can go about his task to consider
men as individuals, where the legislator considered them en masse.
Pound writes of the common-law lawyer's traditional suspicious
approach to legislation:
[T]he common-law lawyer is at his worst when confronted with a
legislative text. His technique is one of developing and applying
23. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, supra note 6, at 270 (emphasis original).
24. R. POUND, supra note 2, at 17-18. In addition:
[Tihe judge's science is to put ...into effect [the principles formulated by the
legislator], to diversify them, and to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned
application, to private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the law when the
letter kills; and not to expose himself to the risk of being alternately slave and
rebel, and of disobeying because of a servile mentality.
Levasseur, supra note 14, at 772.
25. F. RABELAIS, Gargantua in A. LAGARDE & L. MICHARD, XVIe SIECLE, 'LES
GRANDS AUTEURS FRANCAIS Du PROGAMME (1970).
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judicial experience. It is a technique of finding the grounds of
decision in the reported cases. It is a technique of shaping and
reshaping principles drawn from recorded judicial decisions. 6
The intention of a statute must be ascertained from the statute
itself, and the surrounding events can be resorted to only when they
are matters of common knowledge. A statute is the adapted and
relative formulation of the law to a narrowly circumscribed set of in-
terests and circumstances. To extend such a statutory formulation
by analogical reasoning to unprovided-for situations would be tanta-
mount to usurping the political functions of the legislative branch of
government by presuming that the legislator meant to subject to
the same equal treatment interests which, apparently, it had meant
not to include. The force of law of the text explains and justifies
that it be restricted to its letter.27
In addition, the formulation is spent when the imperative in
such text is spent. The text of the law is its own barrier to
growth. It is a thing-in-itself and is not both thing-in-itself and
thing-for-other. . . . [I]n Anglo-American law the jurist turns his
back on the formulated law when it reaches the limit of its com-
mand or its instruction . . . . The received doctrine is that
judicial determinations and not legislative formulations are the
basis for analogical development of law.28
The old and somewhat worn out rivalry between the civil law
and the common law, although not as newsworthy and captivating as
the politically sensitive issue of Britain's membership in the Com-
mon Market" was, nonetheless, a fundamental one: would the civil
law and the common law happily marry under a community of
economic and political gains and develop into a community of
thought? Or would they live a free, willing union, converging when
common interests prevailed but diverging as soon as nationalistic
penchants, be they historical, social, philosophical, resurfaced?
WORKING OUT A MODUS VIVENDI
After having been left holding the knocker to the door of the
European Community for a long and trying period, Great Britain is
26. R. POUND, supra note 2, at 18.
27. In the words of Lord Devlin: "Statutes are not philosphical treatises and the
philosophy behind them, if there is one, is often half-baked." Devlin, Judges and Law
Makers, 39 MOD. L. REV. 1, 14 (1976).
28. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implications
for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v.
Katzenback, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1967).
29. Britain's membership came in 1973.
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now one of the nine. Has it been convinced by the realization that
"[ilf our imagination is strong enough to accept the vision of
ourselves as parts inseverable from the rest, and to extend our final
interest beyond the boundary of our skins, it justifies the sacrifice
even of our lives for ends outside of ourselves?"3 0
A principle of European community law is that national courts
are to apply and interpret community law since the latter is an in-
tegral part of each member state's internal legal order. The British
Parliament adopted this principle by passing the European Com-
munities Act of October 17, 1972. This Act provides in its Section 2
of Part I that
all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions
from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties,
and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided
for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties
are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in
the United Kingdom shall be recognized and available in law,
and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly."1
Henceforth, the normative sources of European community law,
clothed in a civil law apparel, were to be applied by the British
judiciary. This challenge was tailored to the prominence of the
British Bench, as the Master of the Rolls32 admirably described in a
1974 decision:
[W]hen we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty
is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers. It cannot be held back . . . .Any rights or obligations
created by the Treaty are to be given legal effect in England
without more ado .... In future, in transactions which cross the
frontiers, we must no longer speak or think of English law as
something on its own. We must speak and think of Community
law .... This means a great effort for the lawyers. We have to
learn a new system ....
30. A. LIEF, THE DISSENTING OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES xviii (1929).
31. European Communities Act, 1792, c. 68, § 1 at 1948.
32. In a recent article, Lord Denning's influence, as Master of the Rolls, was said
to come
from self-demotion. In 1957, he was sent to the house of lords, but in 1962, he
stepped down to the appeal court because he had found himself in a minority in
the Lords too often .... Might not a developing tradition of wide legal interpreta-
tion go astray with judges of lesser wisdom? ... it is the job of great judges to be
adventurous. If they go wrong, the House of Lords or Parliament can put them
right again ....
The Economist, Jan. 27, 1979, at 18.
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What a task is thus set before us! The Treaty is quite unlike
any of the enactments to which we have become accustomed.
The draftsmen of our statutes have striven to express them-
selves with the utmost exactness. They have tried to foresee all
possible circumstances that may arise and to provide for them.
They have sacrificed style and simplicity. They have foregone
brevity. They have become long and involved. In consequence,
the judges have followed suit. They interpret a statute as apply-
ing only to the circumstances covered by the very words. They
give them a literal interpretation. If the words of the statute do
not cover a new situation-which was not foreseen-the judges
hold that they have no power to fill the gap. To do so would be a
"naked usurpation of the legislative power"....
How different is this Treaty! It lays down general principles.
It expresses its aims and purposes. All in sentences of moderate
length and commendable style. But it lacks precision. It uses
words and phrases without defining what they mean. An English
lawyer would look for an interpretation clause, but he would
look in vain. There is none. All the way through the Treaty
there are gaps and lacunae. These have to be filled in by judges,
or by regulations or directives. It is the European way ...
[W]hat are the English courts to do ... ? They must follow the
European pattern. No longer must they examine the words in
meticulous detail .... They must look to the purpose or intent ...
they must divine the spirit of the treaty and gain inspiration
from it."33
Two years later, Lord Denning pursued his adventurous path in-
to the European way and shared his understanding of the European
pattern:
33. Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] 2 CMLR 91, 111-20. There was a "precedent,"
however, to Lord Denning's opinion, formulated more than four hundred years before.
In 1574, it was opined that
it is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and
our law (like all others) consists of two parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of
the law is the body of the law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of
the law, quiA ratio legis est anima legis. And the law may be resembled to a nut,
which has a shell and a kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell,
and the sense of it the kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you
make use only of the shell, so you will receive no benefit by the law, if you rely
only upon the letter, and as the fruit and profit of the nut lies in the kernel, and
not in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the sense more than
in the letter. And it often happens that when you know the letter, you know not
the sense, for sometimes the sense is more confined and contracted than the let-
ter, and sometimes it is more large and extensive ....
Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695 (1514).
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[The members of the European Court] adopt a method which
they call in English by strange words-at any rate they were
strange to me-the "schematic and teleological" method of inter-
pretation. It is not really so alarming as it sounds. All it means
is that the judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words
or by the grammatical structure of the sentence. They go by the
design or purpose which lies behind it. When they come upon a
situation which is to their minds within the spirit-but not the
letter-of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at
the design and purpose of the legislature-at the effect which it
was sought to achieve. They then interpret the legislation so as
to produce the desired effect. This means that they fill in gaps,
quite unashamedly, without hesitation. They ask simply: what is
the sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give ef-
fect to the presumed purpose of the legislation? They lay down
the law accordingly . . . . To our eyes-shortsighted by tradi-
tion-it is legislation, pure and simple. But, to their eyes, it is
fulfilling the true role of the courts. They are giving effect to
what the legislature intended, or may be presumed to have in-
tended. 4
The gauntlet was thrown! How much longer could the British
courts continue wearing two hats and pursuing two different ap-
proaches to legislation? "Since it is plainly unsatisfactory to combine
within one legal system . . . two methods of interpretation, one of
them will have to give way, and my bet is that the European prin-
ciple and practice will prevail."35 If it is to prevail, it will not be
without the common law method of interpretation putting on a fight.
Common law is so much a "tradition of ideals, method, . . . and prin-
ciples,"3 so very deeply rooted in its history and present mores that
it will stand up firm and determined against this new challenge hurled.
by its old enemy, Rome.
Champions of the common law are many and the challenge was
accepted.
34. Buchanan v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping [1977] 2 CMLR 455, 458-59. Lord
Denning then proceeded to write:
I see nothing wrong in this. Quite the contrary. It is a method of interpretation
which I advocated long ago . . . . In interpreting the Treaty of Rome "which is
part" of our law we must certainly adopt the new approach. Just as in Rome, you
should do as "Rome does."... Even in interpreting our own legislation, we should
do well to throw aside our traditional approach and adopt a more liberal attitude.
We should adopt such a construction as will promote the . . . legislative purpose
underlying the provision ....
Id. at 459.
35. Scarman, Law of Establishment in the European Economic Community, 24 N.
IR. L. Q. 61, 71 (1973).
36. R. POUND, supra note 2, at 8.
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[T]he assumed and often repeated generalisation that English
methods are narrow, technical and literal, whereas continental
methods are broad, generous and sensible seems to me insecure
at least as regards interpretation of international Conventions ....
[T]here is no universal wisdom available across the Channel upon
which our insular minds can draw. We must use our own
methods following "Lord MacMillan's" prescription taking such
help as existing decisions give us. 7
More forceful than Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne wrote
that he knew
of no authority for the proposition that one consequence of this
country joining the European Economic Community is that the
courts of this country should now abandon principles as to con-
struction long established in our law. The courts have rightly
refused to encroach on the province of Parliament and have
refused to engage in legislation. To fill the gap which in his opin-
ion existed, Lord Denning rightly said would in our eyes be
"legislation, pure and simple." 8
The issue appears to be essentially a matter of distribution of
functions between the legislator and the judiciary as well as an
understanding of their respective roles in the formulation of the law.
Supposing this as the case, then it' is within the power of the
legislative branch of the British government to end these Don Quix-
37. Buchanan v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping, [1978] 1 CMLR, 156, 160-61 (opin-
ion of Lord Wilberforce).
38. Buchanan v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping 1 CMLR 156, 164 (opinion of Vis-
count Dilhorne). Even among his peers on the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning found
some resistance to his liberal approach. Evidence of the resistance may be found in the
words of Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce, in Davis v. Johnson, [19781 1 ALL ER 841, 885.
He wrote:
With all respect I am not able to accept [Lord Denning's) reliance on reference to
Parliamentary proceedings as an aid to construction of the words in an Act of
Parliament. I take the law to be that a report to Parliament is not relevant save
for the purpose of appreciating the mischief which the Act seeks to prevent or
remedy. I am not alarmed by the criticism that I am a purist who prefers to shut
his eyes to the guiding light shining in the reports of Parliamentary debates in
the Hansard. The task of this court is to decide what the words of the Act mean.
The subject should be able, as in the past, to read the words of an Act and decide
its meaning without hunting through Hansard to see whether the Act has a dif-
ferent meaning from that which is to be collected by application of the subtle
principles of construction that this court has worked out over the last three cen-
turies. If the words of an Act fail to express the intent that Parliament intended,
Parliament in its sovereign power can amend the Act. An Act means what the
words and phrases selected by the parliamentary draftsmen actually mean, and
not what individual members of the two Houses of Parliament may think they
mean.
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otes and vainless debates by devising a new technique of legislative
drafting. By rethinking the style, structure and the overall
philosophy of statutes, the British Parliament could bring about a
convergence of the common law and the civil law methods in all do-
mains of its constitutional authority. The Members of Parliament
need be convinced that the judges can be trusted to give a sub-
jective meaning to statutes and that the antiquarian suspicion the
Parliament harbored against the judiciary should give place to a
fruitful cooperation inspired by mutual respect. In this line of
thought one may wonder if a "formal" rapprochement between the
common law and the civil law traditions is not in the offing as a
movement of reform is under way in Great Britain.
